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Abstract This paper discusses the eurozone financial crisis. It argues that it was
largely the result of a common monetary policy not being suitable for individual
countries which led to excessive private and public borrowing and a debt crisis.
Neither borrowing rates nor credit ratings anticipated the crisis. Fundamental
changes to eurozone governance are being proposed. The paper examines whether
instead there might be a market solution if financial markets priced risk better.
Accordingly, a more timely way of obtaining credit ratings is shown.
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1 Introduction
Since 2007 eurozone countries have been in a constant state of economic crisis: all
countries have experienced low growth rates; some have had negative growth and
massive unemployment, especially youth unemployment; some countries have had
financial crises with unsustainable private and public debts and sky-high borrowing
rates; Greece is in danger of having to leave the euro in order to survive; even the
continued existence of the euro itself has been called into question. All of this has
caused huge political and social upheavals. Countries have been in conflict over the
appropriate policies to adopt; new anti-austerity political parties have ousted
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traditional parties; immigration has lept as people have searched for work which has
raised social tensions everywhere.
None of this was envisaged when the euro was introduced in 1999 yet, as argued
in this paper, its introduction is the source of the crisis. The paper explains why this
is. It then considers how the euro might be saved. Current discussion has centred on
greater central control of policy: having common fiscal as well as monetary policies,
and even greater political integration through a more federal structure. This paper
asks whether there might be a market solution that does not require more central
control. At present the eurozone has a common monetary policy that enables all
countries to borrow cheaply irrespective of risk, and does so even when the crisis
has revealed the risks involved. The failure of markets to price risk correctly seems
to be a major contributory factor. The market solution proposed to address the long-
term problem simply requires borrowing rates to reflect the risks involved. (In the
short term other measures are required.) The paper shows that this did not happen in
the lead up to the crisis. As a result, both private and public borrowing were
excessive, which led to the crisis.
In supporting these arguments this paper draws on a number of published
technical articles of the author which examine individual aspects. The contribution
of the current paper is to examine their implications for the eurozone crisis.
The paper is set out as follows. In Sect. 2 the origins of the eurozone crisis are
examined and in Sect. 3 the policy implications are discussed. The puzzling failure
of financial markets to correctly price credit risk prior to the crisis is examined in
Sect. 4. In Sect. 5 an independent measure of credit risk for eurozone countries is
described. Some conclusions are drawn in Sect. 6.
2 Origins of the eurozone crisis
The main aim in introducing the euro was to facilitate the development of a single
market in goods and services by removing the transactions costs associated with
foreign exchange through sharing a single currency. The problem, which was
foreseen by many economists, was that the eurozone was not an optimal currency
area having, for example, different fiscal stances, capital markets, labour laws and
rates of inflation. This was downplayed in official circles as it was widely assumed
that eurozone economies would rapidly converge, thereby creating an optimal
currency area. Even more persuasive for countries facing high interest rates was the
expectation that in future they would be able to borrow at much lower rates, such as
those of Germany. This expectation was due to the way that the European Central
Bank sets monetary policy: it targets a weighted average of eurozone inflation rates,
where the weights reflect the size of the member economies. This entailed that
Germany, being a large country with low inflation, would exert a strong influence on
rates. These arrangements were a quid pro quo for the Bundesbank agreeing to set
up the euro as it wanted a large say on the ECB’s monetary policy.
Initial economic developments encouraged optimism of the success of the euro.
Many countries found their borrowing costs were indeed much lower; real interest
rates became negative in some countries. An update of the analysis of Wickens
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(2010) shows the growing problem of eurozone membership. Figure 1 shows the
real rates of interest of selected eurozone countries—the crisis countries plus
Germany. Although prior to the euro real interest rates were positive for each of
these countries in 1998, during the period 2001–2007 real interest rates were
negative with the exception of Germany which had positive real rates throughout
this period.
Lower real interest rates encouraged greater private and public borrowing, which
led to higher rates of economic growth. Figure 2 shows the growth of nominal GDP
in eurozone countries over the period 1998–2013. For the period 1999–2007, the
GDP of Ireland grew by 78 %, that of Greece by 44 %, and that of Spain by 39 %
while that of Germany only grew by 15 %.
This stimulus to economic activity caused price levels to rise sharply, especially
in the countries with low real interest rates. Figure 3 shows the rise in the price level
over the period 1998–2013. It reveals considerable dispersion. Thus, while the price
level in Ireland increased over the period 1999–2008 by 41 %, that of Greece by
38 %, that of Portugal by 35 % and that of Spain by 44 %, Germany’s price level
only increased by 9 %. This entailed a huge loss of competitiveness compared to
Germany for the countries that would prove to be the main crisis countries of the
eurozone.
The connection between low real interest rates and the stimulus this provided for
economic activity and higher inflation is shown in Fig. 4 which plots the growth in
the price level over the period 1999–2007 against the average real interest rate over
that period for selected eurozone countries (Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Portugal and Spain). The graph suggests that the lower the real interest rate, the
higher is inflation.
This evidence shows that eurozone economies have diverged since the inception
of the euro and have not converged as was predicted by most. Further evidence on
Fig. 1 Selected eurozone annual real interest rates 1988–2014
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the lack of convergence is provided by Fig. 5 which shows that the higher was
inflation in 1999, the greater was inflation in the years prior to the financial crisis.
To summarise, this evidence provides strong support for the argument that since
the inception of the euro, eurozone economies, far from converging as expected, had
diverging output and price levels until 2007/2008 when the financial crisis
intervened. Since then there has been little or no output growth and close to zero
inflation. Crucially, as a result of joining the euro, the main crisis countries
experienced negative real interest rates until the crisis and the highest rates of
economic growth and loss of competitiveness. This was due to the (temporary)
stimulus of excessive private and public sector borrowing in these countries which
was fuelled by being able to borrow at negative, and much lower, real interest rates






















Fig. 3 Eurozone (log) price levels 1988–2013 [base P(1998) = 1]
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than they faced prior to joining the euro. In contrast, countries such as Germany, due
to having lower inflation rates prior to joining the euro, did not experience negative
real interest rates and had both much lower growth and inflation thereafter.
Germany also gained in competitiveness.
3 The policy problems facing the eurozone
From a longer-term perspective, the loss of competitiveness and much greater
indebtedness are critical features as they are the most difficult to reverse in the short
to medium term. They are also the main factors in causing the crisis, and they
identify the key weaknesses in the euro system. There is also a symmetry in the
problem that is often overlooked. The emphasis is commonly placed on heavily
over-indebted countries which, because they borrow from abroad, typically have
large current account deficits. But, as Keynes observed in the discussions
surrounding the creation of the Bretton Woods system, the other side of the
Fig. 4 Selected eurozone average real interest rates versus changed in the price level 1999–2007
Fig. 5 Eurozone cumulative infection 2008 versus inflation level
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problem is how to prevent the build up of large current account surpluses. Thus the
eurozone crisis has highlighted the problems of both Greece and Germany.
An essential feature of a successful economic system—and a missing ingredient
in the euro system—is the ability to re-adjust an economy at low cost. The least-cost
way of improving an economy’s competitiveness is to depreciate its exchange rate.
This is denied to eurozone countries as they have a fixed nominal exchange rate
with each other. Instead, they have to resort to an internal depreciation achieved by
lowering labour costs and prices. This has proved to be politically and socially
extremely costly with high unemployment rates, especially for the young, and
increased immigration. It has also led to the Target 2 problem.
Interestingly, under the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system, the UK
continually faced a balance of payments of crisis. As soon as the economy began to
grow, imports exceeded exports. Having assigned monetary policy to fixing the
exchange rate, it was then necessary to tighten fiscal policy to restore current
account balance. It was only when the Bretton Woods system broke down, and the
UK allowed sterling to float, so that competitivenes could be maintained and this
stop-go cycle eliminated.
As a result of the financial crisis and, in particular, the huge build-up of debt,
both fiscal and monetary policy have been conducted in remarkably unconventional
ways. Instead of the usual loosening of fiscal policy in recession, both in the
eurozone and in other countries, such as the UK and the US, the fiscal stance has
been tightened to avoid further accumulation of public debt. Moreover, instead of
tightening monetary policy to discourage further excessive borrowing, monetary
policy has been loosened to such an extent that interest rates became so close to
their lower bound that conventional monetary policy of the last 20 years based on
interest rates targeting inflation became inoperative and was replaced by quantity
Fig. 6 Massive quantitative easings failed to increase credit to the private sector. (1) UK’s reserve
balaces data are seasonally unadjusted. (2) UK’s bank lending data exclude intermediate financial
institutions. (3) Base money’s figures of eurozone are seasonally by Nomura Research Institute. Source:
Nomura Research Institute, based on FRB, ECB and Bank of England data
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controls. The jury is still out on the effectiveness of these unconventional responses.
The signs are not encouraging. Monetary policy, although reducing the cost of
capital, does not appear to have stimulated investment. Instead, it appears to have
distorted financial marketsm, causing a portfolio shift that has resulted in
stockmarket booms, and has impoverished ordinary savers and pensioners through
otherwise lowering savings rates.
Evidence on the failure of unconventional monetary policy to stimulate credit
expansion in the eurozone, the UK and the US is provided in Fig. 6, which is taken
from Koo (2011). It shows that although, as a result of quantitative easing, the
monetary base has expanded hugely since 2008 in all three monetary jurisdictions,
bank credit has, if anything, declined.
The financial difficulties of Greece have revealed more deep-seated flaws in the
euro system. A key role of a central bank is to act as lender of last resort to the
private banks. The European Central Bank has been politically constrained in
carrying out this function. It even suspended support for the Greek banking system
thereby bringing it to the point of collapse. Only a political agreement at heads of
government level prevented this. One problem was that was unclear was whether
Greek banks satisfied Bagehot’s condition that a bank should be solvent in order to
be bailed out. This depended on the market value of their large holdings of Greek
government bonds and whether the Greek government would default on its debt. In
this way the lender of last resort function of the ECB became tied to the solvency of
the Greek state. This is largely a political issue related to the bigger problem of the
rules that apply to eurozone countries on which there appears to be no agreement.
Article 105 of the Maastricht Treaty requires the ECB to maintain an average
eurozone inflation rate not greater than 2 % which it has successfully achieved.
Article 127 of the Lisbon Treaty set out further responsibilities of the ECB. This
Article requires any country leaving the eurozone to also leave the EU. But it does
not set out rules governing country bailouts. Both articles imply that the ECB has
responsibility only for monetary policy. However, it appears that in the financial
crisis the ECB extended its reach to fiscal policy as it set out four fiscal reforms that
Ireland had to undertake before receiving loans from the ECB.
The fiscal rules contained in the Stability and Growth Pact would, if adhered to,
avoid the need for bailouts. Significantly, Germany and France were the first
countries to break the rules. Contrary to the rules, they did so without penalty. The
rules themselves impose a 60 percent limit on a government’s debt–GDP ratio and a
3 % limit on the ratio of the government deficit to GDP. Both of which have been
exceeded since the financial crisis by most eurozone countries, especially by
Greece. These limits imply that the fiscal stance would be permanently sustainable
only with the additional condition that the nominal rate of growth exceeds 5 %.
Since the financial crisis the rate of nominal growth of any eurozone country has
rarely exceeded 5 %. Consequently, even the Maastricht conditions do not provide a
viable rule.
Rules for a bailout remain to be determined by eurozone countries. Switzerland has
a clear no-bailout condition for its cantons which it has adhered to. The eurozone has
shown itself reluctant to impose a no-bailout rule due to concerns about the precedent
this would set: once one country has left the euro the fear is that others may be more
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inclined to do so. At the same time the eurozone has failed to set rules determining the
conditions for the write-down of loans. The results reported below strongly suggest
that it is unlikely that the agreement reached in July 2015 will allow Greece to stay in
the euro without a further substantial write-down of debt.
As a result of the eurozone financial crisis, a number of reforms to the
institutional arrangements of the eurozone are under consideration: a banking union,
a fiscal union and a more federal political structure. The aim of all three would be to
share the burden of economic and financial distress more widely and to impose
common rules on member countries. The banking union would aim to provide a
larger and more mutualised bailout fund. A fiscal union would aim to integrate
decisions on government expenditures and taxation with a view to controlling the
size of budget deficits and fiscal transfers, and avoiding tax competition. Such
reforms would increase the need for joint political supervision and hence a more
federal structure.
To summarise, belonging to the eurozone seems to have been the primary cause
of the financial crisis for many countries. Existing rules governing the eurozone
failed to avert the financial crisis and it is far from clear whether the uncoventional
fiscal and monetary policies implemented after the crisis have led to much
improvement. Being in a fixed exchange rate system is highly likely to significantly
increase the cost of adjustment following negative economic shocks. Deciding how
best to rescue countries in severe financial difficulties has proved politically
contentious. For example, Germany is concerned that the eurozone is becoming a
transfer union. Nonetheless, in order to save monetary union, fiscal transfers
between countries may be required. This may entail greater political integration and
a banking and fiscal union which would also be contentious. For example, the
French prime minister has recently said that France will decide its own budget. The
alternative is a no-bailout rule entailing limited national fiscal autonomy. Having
given up their monetary policy instrument, eurozone countries would then have also
given up their independent fiscal policy instrument plus considerable political
independence.
4 Puzzling failure of financial markets to correctly price credit risk
An intriguing feature of the financial crisis rarely, if ever, drawn attention to is the
failure of financial markets prior to the crisis to correctly price credit risk. Had they
done so perhaps the crisis in the US, the UK and the eurozone could have been
avoided. And if they do so in the future, perhaps this will solve one of the
fundamental problems of the eurozone, namely, the ability of the more profligate
countries to borrow at the same rate as the more prudent countries. In this way it
may be possible for the eurozone to survive without the need for greater political
and fiscal integration. Even now the ECB, through its near zero repo rate and its
burgeoning QE programme, is trying to drive down borrowing rates rather than have
them reflect borrowing risks.
The recent academic literature on financial frictions is attempting to fill a gap in
macro-finance by analysing the effect on interest rates of default, especially default
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in the inter-bank market, see for example Curdia and Woodford (2008) and Gertler
and Kiyotaki (2010). The main result is that banks should charge a credit
premium—an external finance premium—to borrowers that might default. An odd
feature of this literature is the assumption that banks are risk neutral and the credit
premium is in order that the expected return on the loan is the same when default is
thought a possibility as when it is not. In other words, the external finance premium
is not a risk premium.
Although the financial frictions literature may provide an explanation of the rise
in borrowing rates following the financial crisis, and why the subsequent recession
was so deep and prolonged, it does not explain the financial crisis as borrowing rates
did not anticipate the crisis as envisaged in the financial frictions literature. Not only
did spreads not increase prior to the financial crisis, nor were sovereign credit
ratings downgraded. Evidence on the official credit ratings of eurozone countries
over the period 1990–2012 is provided in Fig. 7. In short, financial markets failed to
reflect the risks building up prior to the crisis which is evident in the graphs above.
Once the financial crisis began eurozone CDS prices started rising as shown in
Fig. 8. Starting near zero at the start of 2008 for all eurozone countries, CDS prices
rose in 2009, and again in 2011–2012 before falling in 2013. (Note the difference in
scales across countries.) In contrast, credit ratings remained largely unaffected for
most countries and only fell for the crisis countries in 2010 or 2011. Even for
Greece CDS prices did not rise much until 2010, which is when its credit rating
started to be steadily downgraded.
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Fig. 7 Historic sovereign credit ratings 1990–2012
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5 Model-based credit ratings
The failure of financial markets to anticipate the financial crisis suggests that they
would not be capable of providing the corrective to the borrowing rates of individual
economies that is required to offset the one-size-fits-all monetary policy of the
eurozone and thereby obviate the growing pressure for fundamental reform.
Although the ECB has criticised the performance of the credit rating agencies and
has advocated an independent assessment of credit ratings, the cost of this has been
regarded as prohibitive, see Polito and Wickens (2015).
The fundamental problem is to develop an early warning mechanism for possible
fiscal distress. A key question is whether a country’s fiscal stance is sustainable
without policy changes. Most econometric studies of fiscal sustainability have
focused on the time series properties of government deficits and debts and, in
particular, whether they are stationary processes and not on an explosive trajectory,
when they would be unsustainable. This is an entirely backward-looking assessment
and, in the event of finding that the current stance is unsustainable, is open to the
response that policy will be changed in the future so that the fiscal stance becomes
sustainable. To make matters worse, in principle the policy change could be in the
indefinite future. Given that financial markets are concerned about the short run as
well as the long run, and about the future rather than the past, clearly this is not a
practical way to assess the fiscal stance.
Polito and Wickens (2011, 2012, 2015) suggested two alternative approaches that
focus on the future rather than the past. The first two papers propose an index of the





































































































Fig. 8 Credit ratings and CDS prices 2007–2013
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to meet current debt liabilities. The third paper focuses on the cost of financing
expected future government debt liabilities by providing an independent assessment
of sovereign credit ratings. This approach seems the more promising as it provides
credit ratings that are much more timely than the official credit ratings. For example,
downgrades were identified that either coincided with the onset of the financial
crisis or before it began.
A credit rating is an opinion about the likelihood of default by a government and
is based on (1) the perceived ability to service debt—a fiscal issue—and (2) the
willingness of a government to service its debt—a non-fiscal issue. The measure of
Polito and Wickens considers only the former. It is obtained by comparing the
probability that forecasts of the future debt–GDP ratio over a given time horizon
exceed a debt–GDP limit, and then mapping this probability into a credit rating
using tables provided by Moody’s. The problem not dissimilar to that of pricing an
American option. The forecasts and their probability distributions are obtained using
a time-varying vector autoregression based on the inter-temporal government
budget constraint, but could be derived in other ways, if preferred. The debt limits
reflect the maximum tax revenue capacity of an economy and are derived from an
open-economy DSGE model with a Laffer curve from which labour tax revenues
are maximised. Credit ratings obtained in this way are compared with those derived
on the assumption of no change in tax policy. In this way the fiscal space available
to an economy may be assessed. Full details may be found in Polito and Wickens
(2015).
The debt–GDP limits are based on the inter-temporal government budget









dt ¼ gt þ zt  vt
qt ¼ ibt  pt  ct:
where yt is real GDP, dt is the real primary deficit, gt is real government expen-
ditures, zt is real transfers, vt is real tax revenues including seigniorage revenues,
bt
yt
is the debt-GDP ratio, pt is the inflation rate, ct is the rate of growth of GDP, i
b
t is the
nominal interest rate and qt may be interpreted as the effective discount rate after

















The debt limits are obtained from forecasts of the variables on the right-hand side.
They may be interpreted as the current level of debt that may be financed from
future expected tax revenues vtþs given forecasts of the other variables. Two limits
are of particular interest, IGBCL which uses forecasts of future tax revenues on the
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assumption of no change in policy rules, and FL which assumes that labour tax
revenues are maximised using the DSGE model, see Davig et al. (2010, 2011).
Figure 9 shows the two debt limits and the actual debt–GDP ratio. In general, FL
is not far above IGBCL, implying that there is not much room for additional taxes.
The exceptions are Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the UK, all of
which have more fiscal space. The two debt limits lie above the actual debt-GDP
ratio for all but two countries, implying that their fiscal stances are sustainable.
Portugal after 2008 is an exception. Its debt-GDP ratio lies above IGBCL, implying
that its fiscal stance is not sustainable under unchanged policy. But it lies below FL
implying that its fiscal stance is sustainable under tax maximising policy.
Significantly, Greece’s debt–GDP ratio lies above both IGBCL and FL for the
whole time that it has been in the eurozone and therefore has never had a sustainable
fiscal stance over this period. A further implication of these findings is that Greece
will be unable to meet its debt obligations in the future unless it takes more drastic
fiscal actions such as reducing expenditures or raising sales taxes.
The probability of defaulting between period t and t þ h given information up to





where pt;tþh is the probability of defaulting in period t þ h, but not before, is given
by



























































Fig. 9 IGBCL, FL limits and debt-GDP ratio
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pt;tþh ¼ ptþh 1 ptþh1ð Þ 1 ptþh2ð Þ. . . 1 ptþ1ð Þ
and ptþh, the probability of defaulting in period t þ h, is obtained by comparing the
forecast of the debt–GDP ratio in period t þ h with the debt limit
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Fig. 10 Credit ratings
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denotes the debt limit, IGBCL, FL and MDL, which implausibly assumes
no government expenditures, i.e. gt þ zt ¼ 0. pct;tþh is then mapped into a credit
rating using tables from Moody’s.
The alternative credit ratings for these countries for the period 1995–2012 based
on these three different debt limits, together with the official credit rating, are shown
in Fig. 10a, b. There are differences from the official ratings for all countries. For
many countries the downgrades compared with the official ratings are small, and
only emerge at the start of the financial crisis. Following the crisis, some countries
are given an upgrade by the model-based credit ratings while the official ratings
remained lowered. For the crisis countries, the downgrades are much larger and
emerge prior to the crisis. Once again Greece is the main outlier; the model-based
rating starts to downgrade Greece well before joining the euro and gives it a junk-
bond rating from 2003, which is before the official downgrade started in 2009.
These results suggest that it is possible to obtain credit ratings cheaply and
independently of the official ratings and that these ratings identify potential
problems with the fiscal stance earlier than the official ratings.
6 Conclusions
This paper has argued that the eurozone financial crisis was in large part the result of
a common monetary policy not being suitable for individual countries. This created
excessive private and public borrowing and a balance sheet recession in which
expansionary monetary policy has had limited success. In this way, the limitations
of monetary policy where there is a single currency and many independent fiscal
jurisdictions has brought about high debt–GDP ratios and caused a fiscal crisis. The
other side of the problem is that of countries with excessive current account
surpluses. The financial markets failed to identify the crisis beforehand. The model
of credit ratings presented would have identified and signalled to market participants
signs of the impending European sovereign debt crisis well before 2010, when the
official credit ratings first reacted to the crisis. This would have resulted in higher
borrowing costs for the countries that over-borrowed due to negative real interest
rates and may have helped prevent the crisis.
Greece is clearly a special case. Its debts are so large that there are severe doubts
that they can be repaid if Greece stays in the euro. The credit ratings for Greece
presented above suggest that its fiscal problems were evident well before Greece
joined the euro and that it will be unable to repay its debt in full in the future.
The financial crisis has caused the ECB to extend its brief to fiscal matters in
order to protect its loans to the banking system and to be able to carry out the lender
of last resort function of a central bank. The extreme problems of Greece have
prompted considerations of fundamental changes to governance in the eurozone: a
banking union, a fiscal union and a political federation.
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Arguably, if credit risk were accurately assessed then the probability of default
would be reflected in borrowing rates. In this way the market would automatically
correct for the inherent and unavoidable limitations of eurozone monetary policy
that has permitted countries to borrow at rates more suited to Germany. Changes to
the governance of the eurozone designed to make monetary union sustainable might
then be unnecessary.
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